There is a long-standing and widespread consensus that semipresidentialism is bad for democratic performance. This article examines whether there is empirical evidence to support the arguments against semipresidentialism. Examining countries that incompletely consolidated and yet not autocratic, we identify the relationship between democratic performance and the three main arguments against semi-presidentialism -the strength of the presidency, cohabitation and divided minority government. We find that there is a strong and negative association between presidential power and democratic performance, but that cohabitation and divided minority government do not have the negative consequences that the literature predicts.
Introduction
In Afghanistan in January 2004, members of the Constitutional Loya Jurga approved a new constitution. As late as September 2003 the draft constitution divided executive is known as cohabitation. Linz and Stepan (1996: 286) identify the circumstances when the effects of cohabitation may be problematic:
When supporters of one or the other component of semipresidentialism feel that the country would be better off if one branch of the democratically legitimated structure of rule would disappear or be closed, the democratic system is endangered and suffers an overall loss of legitimacy, since those questioning one or the other will tend to consider the political system undesirable as long as the side they favor does not prevail.
In these circumstances, they argue that "policy conflicts often express themselves as a conflict between two branches of democracy" (ibid: 287). Each actor claims to be the legitimate authority and tries to assume power at the expense of the other. Naturally enough, democracy as a whole can suffer.
In fact, the problem of a divided executive under semi-presidentialism is compounded by the worry that intra-executive conflict may not be confined to periods of cohabitation. For Linz, semi-presidential systems are inherently problematic: "The result inevitably is a lot of politicking and intrigues that may delay decision making and lead to contradictory policies due to the struggle between the president and prime minister" (Linz 1994: 55) . In this regard, Linz is particularly concerned about the relationship between the executive and the military. In semi-presidential systems there may be three or even four major actors: the president, the prime minister, the minister for defence and the joint chief of staff of the armed forces. In this situation, he states: "The hierarchical line that is so central to military thinking acquires a new complexity" (ibid: 57). This complexity leaves room for "constitutional ambiguities regarding one of the central issues of many democracies: the subordination of the military to the democratically elected authorities and hopefully to civilian supremacy" (ibid: 59). As we have seen, the absence of single point of contact is a reason why semipresidentialism was rejected in Afghanistan.
The problem of divided minority government in semi-presidential countries
The third argument against semi-presidentialism is closer to a problem usually associated with parliamentarism. In her work, Cindy Skach identifies this problem as 'divided minority government'. She defines this situation as the case where "neither the president nor the prime minister, nor any party or coalition, enjoys a substantive majority in the legislature" (Skach 2005: 15) . She says that this situation "can predictably lead to an unstable scenario, characterized by shifting legislative coalitions and government reshuffles, on the one hand, and continuous presidential intervention and use of reserved powers, on the other" (ibid: 17-18). In turn, the situation can deteriorate: "The greater the legislative immobilism, governmental instability, and cabinet reshuffling resulting from the minority position of the government, the more justified or pressured the president may feel to use their powers beyond their constitutional limit, for a prolonged period of time" (ibid: 18). In other words, while the scenario is different from cohabitation, the result is the same. When the executive is weakened, in this case because of the absence of either a stable presidential or prime ministerial parliamentary majority, directly elected presidents feel the need to assert their control over the system and the process of democratisation suffers. Seemingly, therefore, there are good theoretical reasons to suggest that semi-presidentialism is problematic. To date, though, the arguments against semi-presidentialism remain largely untested. In the one statistical study of the performance of semi-presidentialism relative to that of parliamentarism and presidentialism, Moestrup (2007) has identified important regional differences.
Specifically, she finds that while "semi-presidential regimes on average have performed worse than other regime types in the Americas and Asia, they appear to have performed … better than parliamentary systems in Eastern Europe" (Moestrup 2007: 39) . For the most part, though, evidence to support the arguments against semi-presidentialism is largely qualitative. For example, Linz and Stepan argue that divided government was particularly difficult for Poland in the years immediately following democratisation. They state: "Because of party fragmentation and its dualistic deadlock, Poland's efforts to advance toward a balanced budget and a mixed economy stalled" (Linz and Stepan 1996: 282) . In her work, Skach has suggested that divided minority government contributed to the collapse of democracy in Weimar Germany and that it is one of the causes of the problems of democracy in contemporary Russia: "It was during the intense crisis period of divided minority government in 1993 that Yeltsin took Russia largely out of the democratic box, and pushed through a constitution that boosted the power of the presidency" (Colton and Skach 2005: 122) . Finally, a study of Guinea-Bissau has suggested that semi-presidentialism may have been a better choice than pure presidentialism. However, the authors conclude that "it is the highly presidentialised nature of the system rather than the system itself that is problematic" (Azevedo and Nijzink 2007: 158) . In the next section, we test whether there is robust empirical evidence to support the arguments against semi-presidentialism.
Sample, hypotheses, variables, model specification and findings
In this article, semi-presidentialism is defined as the situation where there is a directly elected president and a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to the legislature. This is now a common way of defining this type of Therefore, a country like Ireland with a figurehead president, but nonetheless a directly elected president, should be classed as semi-presidential as well as a country like Russia with a very powerful directly elected president. In one sense, such a definition seems counterintuitive. However, there are at least two reasons for adopting this definition. Firstly, a definition that includes reference to the powers of the president leads to a problem of selection bias. If the list of semipresidential countries includes only those countries with at least moderately powerful countries, then it is hardly surprising that semi-presidentialism is associated with the standard problems of presidentialisation. By defining semipresidentialism without reference to the powers of the president, we avoid any problem of selection bias. Certainly, it means that we should not operationalise semi-presidentialism as a discrete explanatory variable. However, it also means that we can explore the effects of variation within semi-presidentialism. To what extent does this variation matter? We hypothesise that it does matter and that semi-presidential countries with stronger presidents are likely to perform worse than those with weaker presidents. Secondly, it must be acknowledged that some countries choose to have directly elected presidents with very few powers. These countries choose to operate in a parliamentary-like manner, but, for whatever reason, they also choose to directly elect their president. This is a discrete constitutional choice and it is a choice that is different from a parliamentary system with an indirectly elected president or a monarch. Are there benefits to combining a directly elected and weak president and a strictly parliamentary system? We hypothesise that such countries may perform better than those that choose to combine a directly elected and powerful president with a government that is responsible to the legislature.
To identify a semi-presidential country on the basis of our definition, it is necessary simply to read the country's constitution. This means that there is very little room for the list of semi-presidential countries to vary from one writer to the next. There is no need to make a call as how powerful a country's president must be in order for it to be classed as semi-presidential. Instead, it is simply necessary to identify those countries that have both a directly elected president and a prime minister and cabinet that are responsible to the legislature. That said, there are still some judgment calls to be made. For example, we exclude countries such as South Korea, where the legislature has to consent to the individual appointment of the prime minister, rather like the case of cabinet nominations in the US, and where, once appointed, the legislature has no means to dismiss the government. All the same, we ensure that our findings are not sensitive to case selection on the basis of these and other definitional issues. only when a country has reached a certain point of democratization. In other words, in an autocracy the institutional effects of semi-presidentialism have no room to have a negative influence on democratic performance because the political system is so tightly controlled and democratic performance is already so poor. By the same token, it is also assumed that the negative consequences of semi-presidentialism have no impact on a country that is fully consolidated. In these countries, semi-presidentialism may have some or other effect on policy outcomes, but the quality of democracy cannot be impaired when democracy is 'the only game in town'. Overall, it is assumed that the negative consequences of semi-presidentialism will be observable only in countries that remain incompletely consolidated and yet are not autocratic.
To identify this set of countries within the category of countries with semipresidential constitutions, we use the measures of democracy provided by the Polity IV project. 1 The methodology adopted by Polity is widely used in comparative analysis. The Polity project scores countries on a scale from -10 (complete autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy). This scale cannot be used as a continuous measure of democracy. 2 However, there are various ways in which the scale can be adapted to the research project at hand. The authors of the Polity project make a distinction between three categories of countries. Those scoring from -10 to -6 inclusive are autocracies; those from -5 to +5 are anocracies; and those from +6 to +10 are democracies. Anocracies are transitonal regimes that are "about three times more likely to experience major reversions to autocracy than democracies" (ibid.). Therefore, a key feature of anocracies is that they are relatively unstable and that instability is often associated with a shift to autocracy. Other writers have operationalised the Polity scores somewhat differently. For example, Przeworski et al (2000) adopted a dichotomous distinction between autocracies (-10 to 0 inclusive) and democracies (+1 to +10).
In this article, we assume that countries scoring 0 or below are insufficiently democratic for semi-presidentialism to have a negative effect on democratic performance. Equally, we assume that countries scoring +10 are fully consolidated and that again the institutional effects of semi-presidentialism will not affect democratic performance. However, within this range the supposed perils of semi-presidentialism may have an impact. Figure 2 identifies all countries with semi-presidential constitutions that have been placed in the range +1 to +9 by Polity. We include countries, such as the Comoros, CongoBrazzaville, Moldova and Weimar Germany, which were semi-presidential for a period when they scored within that range, but have since abandoned semipresidentialism. Each year that a country was semi-presidential and scored in the range +1 to+9 is one observation. There are 393 observations in total. This is a very unbalanced sample: 36 countries are observed across a period of 86 years.
The number of years for which countries are observed ranges from one (Belarus) to 42 (France). The first country to be observed is Germany from 1919-1932, while Timor-Leste does not enter the dataset until 2002.
Given that we cannot use the Polity measures as a continuous variable, we dichotomise the dependent variable to measure the performance of democracy.
Thus, we distinguish between two categories of countries -those that score in the range +1 to +5 inclusive (anocracies) and those that score in the range +6 to +9 (democracies). We assume that the three purported disadvantages of semipresidentialism will be associated with poor democratic performance and, hence, with anocracies rather than democracies. In our sample, 32.7 per cent of the observations are anocracies.
Figure 2 about here
We have three explanatory variables. The first explanatory variable is the power of the president. We hypothesise that powerful presidents will be associated with anocracies rather than democracies. To measure the power of presidents, we use the scale proposed by Siaroff (2003) . He identifies nine constitutional indicators of presidential power. He gives a value of 1 if the constitution includes the indicator and 0 otherwise. He then measures the powers of presidents cross-nationally within a range of 0 to 9. 3 The scores for the countries in our sample are given in Figure 2 . In a small number of cases, we had to measure the power of presidents ourselves because Siaroff did not code them.
These scores are provided in Table 1 . For our sample, the minimum score in Siaroff's schema is 1 because one of his indicators is the direct election of the president and all of the countries in our sample will score 1 for this indicator.
Overall, our sample is skewed towards semi-presidential countries with strong presidents: the mean is 5.9 along a range of 1 to 9.
Table 1 about here
The second explanatory variable is cohabitation. We hypothesise that cohabitation will be associated with anocracies rather than democracies. To identify periods of cohabitation, we began the process of identifying periods of cohabitation by consulting www.worldstatesmen.org. This is a very thorough and reliable data source. It provides the names and terms of office of all presidents and prime ministers. It also records their party affiliation. We identified all cases when the party affiliation of the two executive actors was specifically identified and when it was different. We excluded cases where either the president or the prime minister was classed as non-partisan. We then consulted secondary sources to confirm whether the cases where the party affiliation of the president and the prime minister was different were examples of coalition government, namely where the president and prime minister were from different parties but where the president's party was represented in government, or cohabitation, the situation where the president and prime minister were from opposing parties and where the president's party was not represented in government. Cohabitation is quite rare in our sample: it accounts for only 9.4 per cent of 393 observations.
The third explanatory variable is divided minority government. We hypothesise that divided minority government will be associated with anocracies rather than democracies. We identified periods of divided minority government The more fragmented the legislature, the more difficult it is to sustain democracy. Therefore, the greater the fractionalisation, the more likely a country is to be an anocracy. We did not opt for full fixed-effects estimation because of the radically imbalanced nature of our panel. However, we do test for country effects by dropping one by one all of the countries that appear for over ten years in the dataset. Our model is a pooled logit with Newey-West standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We present four models in Table 2 .
The first is our basic model and the other three test its robustness to sampling and measurement issues. It is worth mentioning the performance of the controls included in all equations. As the literature would predict, the wealth variable is always a significant predictor of democracy. In contrast to previous studies, a larger population is associated with democracy. This effect may be due to the fact that micro-states are already excluded from the Polity data set. Unsurprisingly, the effective number of parties is associated with anocracy. However, ethnic fractionalisation is associated with democracy, although its coefficient is not always significant. It seems likely that in our analyses much of the effect of ethnic fractionalisation is channelled through the party system. The post-Cold War era is always positively and significantly associated with democracy. The results for the European dummy are inconsistent across the equations.
Table 2 about here
We will now discuss our semi-presidential variables equation by equation.
As predicted, presidential power is bad for democracy. The presidential power coefficient is in the right direction and is highly significant. Logit coefficients are difficult to interpret directly. However, we can compare the probabilities for different values of the index of presidential power. Taking, an average European post-Cold War observation in terms of GDP, population, party system and ethnic fragmentation, without divided majority government or cohabitation and the maximum level of presidential power, then the probability of democracy is 0.51.
Holding all else equal but reducing presidential power to the minimum the probability of democracy doubles to approach certainty -0.98. These figures are clearly substantively, as well as statistically, significant.
By contrast, the cohabitation variable is significantly in the wrong direction. The minority government hypothesis is insignificant and in the wrong direction.
We tested the robustness of these conclusions to the inclusion of countries in our sample by rerunning the model, while excluding one-by-one all 20 country cases that were observed for at least ten years. None of these exclusions made a substantive difference to the models, in terms of significance level and/or sign of coefficient, except for Sri Lanka. In model 2, we can see that the exclusion of Sri Lanka does not modify our conclusion regarding presidential power. Neither does the significantly positive result for divided minority government provide a basis for re-evaluating this variable. Nonetheless, model 2 is quite revealing in respect of cohabitation. Sri Lanka 2003 is the only observation of cohabitation in an anocracy. As we noted already, cohabitation is very rare in semi-presidential regimes. It is even more rare outside Europe: Niger, Sri Lanka and Mongolia are the only non-European countries to have experienced cohabitation, for one, two and three years respectively. In short, we suspect our striking finding on cohabitation is more likely a result of its rarity than it operating according to a logic, which is radically different to that outlined in the qualitative literature.
We also investigate the robustness of our models to two measurement issues. Sudden shifts in the Polity rating of countries may affect our conclusions.
For example, according to our measure, described above, a democracy that underwent a sudden transition from democracy to autocracy, without going through even one year of anocracy would simply drop out of the dataset and no decline in democratic performance would be registered. Conversely, a country might move directly from anocracy to consolidated democracy without an increase being noted. There are seven cases of such sudden regime change in our sample (Belarus 1994 , Austria 1932 and 1945 , Peru 1991 , Niger 1995 , Germany 1932 and Finland 1943 . We recoded each of these to record a shift to anocracy or democracy, as appropriate, before the country exits the dataset. As model 3
shows, this did not affect our conclusions. in our illustration of the presidential power index, the probability of democracy in a weakly presidential system is 0.99. In a balanced system, it is 0.86 and in strongly presidential systems it is 0.68.
Discussion
There are three major arguments against semi-presidentialism. The findings in the previous section showed that there was evidence to support one of those arguments but not the other two. In countries with a semi-presidential constitution, when the powers of the presidency are great, the performance of democracy is likely to be less good. However, when there is cohabitation and when there is minority government, there is no statistical association with poor democratic performance, despite the prevailing academic wisdom. What might account for these findings?
In semi-presidential countries with strong presidents, there is the opportunity for the cumulation of powers in a way that resembles pure presidential systems. Under semi-presidentialism, a president who is supported by a parliamentary majority is able to appoint a loyal prime minister whose constitutional powers can also be called upon to implement the president's agenda. In this event, already enjoying considerable constitutional power in his/her own right, the president can exercise further powers indirectly because of the acquiescence of the prime minister. Given the supportive majority in the legislature, this situation means that there are very few constraints on the president's executive and legislative powers. In this scenario, there is little incentive for the president to share power and there is little opportunity for the opposition to have any influence over decision making. By contrast, there is plenty of opportunity for the president to pursue a self-interested agenda to the detriment of the quality of democracy. There is evidence to suggest that this situation is at least partly responsible the problems of democratic consolidation in countries like Peru in the early 1900s, Mozambique, Namibia and Tanzania.
That said, the association between strong presidents and poor democratic performance needs to be placed in context. While the association may be strong statistically, there is always the possibility that the problems experienced by countries with strong presidents may pre-date the adoption of semipresidentialism. In other words, strong semi-presidential presidents may not be the cause of poor democratic performance. Instead, poor democratic performance may be endogenous to the selection of this form of semipresidentialism. For example, Mozambique, Namibia and Tanzania all began the process of democratisation in the context of systems in which one party was dominant and where strong and/or historic leaders were already in power. In this context, while the maintenance of an anocracy with some democratic credentials may still be a remarkable achievement, the inability to establish a full democracy may be at least partly the result of the founding context rather than the exogenous impact of the particular form of president-dominant semipresidentialism that can be found in these countries.
The absence of any statistically significant association between cohabitation and poor democratic performance runs counter to the standard academic consensus. In part, this may be because cohabitation is a relatively rare phenomenon. The association may become stronger as more countries experience semi-presidentialism and for longer periods of time. In addition, while cohabitation may not be associated with a poorer standard of democracy, there is anecdotal evidence to sugges that it does have an impact on the decision-making There is also a sense in which the impact of divided government may be underestimated by the methodology used in this article. For example, in a couple of cases -notably Armenia and Belarus -the decline in the countries' Polity scores was swift. Both of these countries went from the status of a democracy to an autocracy, and hence exited from the dataset, within the space of one or two years. These countries both experienced minority government but they did so when they occurred in our dataset as democracies. Thus, minority government may have had a negative effect on democratic performance, but it is not captured in our dataset because the country did not go through a long-term period of anocracy when there was divided minority government.
In addition, we have used the absence of a legislative majority as our proxy for divided minority government. While Skach (2005: 116) states that divided minority government is the case where "neither the president nor the prime minister has a legislative majority", she adds that "the president is usually also divided against the prime minister" (ibid.) and she calls this the "most difficult subtype of the semi-presidential model" (ibid. scenario that is potentially problematic, it is also particularly rare in terms of how we have defined democracy and anocracy. Altogether, we find no significant association between either minority government and poor democratic performance or the combination of both cohabitation and minority government and poor democratic performance.
Overall, the findings for minority government are not sensitive to the inclusion of particular countries. Indeed, the dataset provides no evidence at all for the negative effect of minority government. Certainly, more work needs to be conducted on the potentially negative effects of divided minority government, but no support is found for any such effects in this article.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that the conventional wisdom about semipresidentialism needs to be reconsidered. We do not claim that semipresidentialism should be adopted or that semi-presidentialism is a better constitutional choice than either presidentialism or parliamentarism. However, we have demonstrated that there is no evidence to support two of three main arguments against semi-presidentialism, namely those that emphasise the supposedly harmful effects of cohabitation and divided minority government. In October 2007 Turkish voters approved a constitutional amendment introducing a semi-presidential system. More than that, they approved the introduction of semi-presidentialism in a system where the president is a powerful figure. The findings of this article suggest that this form of semipresidentialism is associated with poorer democratic performance than the situation where the semi-presidential president is more of a figurehead.
Assuming the findings of this article are correct, then, all else equal, we predict a decline in the future performance of Turkish democracy. 
